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Introduction
Cyber and the Changing Face of War
Claire Finkelstein and Kevin Govern

I. War and Technological Change
In 2012, journalist David Sanger reported that the United States, in conjunction with
Israel, had unleashed a massive virus into the computer system of the Iranian nuclear
reactor at Natanz, where the Iranians were engaged in enriching uranium for use in
nuclear weaponry.1 Operation "Olympic Games" was conceived as an alternative to a
kinetic attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. It was the first major offensive use of America's
cyberwar capacity, but it was seen as justified because of the importance of preempt
ing Iran's development of nuclear weapons. The so-called "Stuxnet" virus successfully
wreaked havoc with Iran's nuclear capabilities, damaging critical infrastructure and
spreading massive confusion among Iranian scientists and engineers. The damage was
comparable to a direct physical attack on Natanz, though perhaps even more debilitat
ing, given the difficulties of attribution and the extremely covert nature of the attack.
Operation Olympic Games issued in a new era in national defense. As former CIA
Chief Michael Hayden reportedly remarked, "This is the first attack of a major nature in
which a cyber attack was used to effect physical destruction."2 He likened the transforma
tion in warfare to that which occurred in 1945 with the release of the atomic bomb over
Hiroshima. The computer infrastructure ofNorth Korea sustained serious damage, just
two days after President Obama warned that the United States would not accept North
Korea's threats to attack the infrastructure of Sony pictures unless they cancelled plans
to make the movie The Interview, intended to portray a CIA plot to kill North Korean
President Kim Jong-Un. Sony capitulated and cancelled the movie premiere, much to the
consternation of the U.S. government.3
Cyberwar, also known as cyberspace operations, is defined �y a Department of
Defense Memorandum as "(t]he employment of cyber capabilities where the primary
purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. " 4 The Memorandum goes
on to say that such operations "include computer network operations and activities to
operate and defend the Global Information Grid." As this definition makes clear, the

1 David E Sanger, "Obama Order Sped Up Wave o f Cyberattacks Against Iran," The New York Times,
June 1, 2012, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of
cyberattacks-against-iran.html>.
2 See David E Sanger, Confront and Conceal (London: Crown Publishers, 2012), 200.
3 Soraya N McDonald, " Sony tells theaters they can pass on showing 'The Interview.' Premiere
canceled," Washington Post, December 17, 2014, at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning
mix/wp/2014/ 12/17/sony-tells-theaters-they-can-pass-on-showing-the-interviewI>.
• Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, " Memorandum for Chiefs of the Military Services: joint
Terminology for Cyberspace Operations," Washington, November 2010, at james E. Cartwright http://
www.defense.gov/bios/biographydetail.aspx?biographyid=l38; "joint Terminology for Cyberspace
Operations," in Cyberwar Resources Guide, Item #51, at <http://www.projectcyw-d.org/resources/items/
show/51> (accessed November 26, 2014).
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concept of cyberwar contains an implicit recognition that the US has a security inter
est in the operation of its electronic network that surpasses the immediate impact of
military operations on the protection of human life. Protecting the Grid is compara
ble to protecting our physical borders: informational security and autonomy have thus
become key attributes of national sovereignty.
The importance of defending our electronic infrastructure grows consistently as
our dependence on information technology grows. Offensive cyber capacities are of
increasing military importance, due to the converse dependence on information tech
nology on the part of our adversaries. At the same time that cyber attacks are provid
ing an increasingly attractive alternative to direct kinetic operations, US and other
forces have independently been shifting from kinetic targeting strategies towards
more multifaceted approaches, such as those involving diplomacy, economic assis
tance, education and communications. Cyber operations fit somewhat better with this
approach than do traditional kinetic operations. The changing nature of warfare, as
well as the changed circumstances in which war takes place, have enhanced the attrac
tions of inflicting the damage of war by non-kinetic means. The methods of cyberwar
have thus arrived at a propitious moment.

II. Placing Cyberwar in Historical Context
In 2006, the Department of Defense (DoD) Joint Staff developed a formerly-classi
fied "National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations," reflecting a substantially
developed and operationally integrated defense cyber capacity. 5 That strategy defined
cyberspace as "a domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromag
netic spectrum to store, modify and exchange information via networked informa
tion systems and physical infrastructures." 6 By 2011, the concept of cyber operations
was well enough established that (retired) General Michael Hayden, former Director
of the National Security Agency and Central Intelligence Agency, could comment:
"[!)ike everyone else who is or has been in a US military uniform, I think of cyber as
a domain. It is now enshrined in doctrine: land, sea, air, space, cyber."7 However, the
seeds of the cyber revolution were sown long before 201 1 , even prior to the develop
ment of computer technology. The techniques of cyberwar are a subset of a broader
approach to national defense technology, one that involves the use of the electromag
netic spectrum. The more general category might aptly be called "Electromagnetic
Warfare" (EW ) , of which both cyber and electromagnetic activities are a part.8
5

DoD, "The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations" (2006) 11.
DoD, "The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations" (2006) ll.
7 Michael V Hayden, "The Future ofThings 'Cyber"' (2011) 5 Strategic Studies Quarterly 3. By contrast,
Libicki's conclusion is very much the opposite:
6

[U]nderstanding cyberspace as a warfighting domain is not helpful when it comes to under
standing what can and should be done to defend and attack networked systems. To the extent
that such a characterization leads strategists and operators to presumptions or conclusions
that are not derived from observation and experience, this characterization may well mislead.
Libicki, (n 4) 336.
8 See Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-38, Cyber Electromagnetic Activities, February
2014 at <http://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-38.pdf>.
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One of the first uses of the harnessed electromagnetic spectrum for communica
tions in warfare was the telegraph.9 The telegraph also became the first physical target
of EW more than one hundred years prior to the cyber age. By the time of the civil
war, 50,000 miles of telegraph cable had been laid for purely military purposes.10 The
telegraph was as much of a revolution jn military affairs in the19th Century as cyber
warfare is in the 21st. Mobile military telegraph wagons sent and received messages
behind the front lines all the way to the first President Lincoln's War Department
Telegraph Office . 1 1 Prior to this innovation, the ability to have rapid exchanges
between a national leader at the seat of government and his forces in the field had been
difficult to impossible. With the telegraph, however, there could be almost instantane
ous communication between Washington and armies in distant fields. 1 2
The demands on this valuable means of communication led to the first governmen
tal seizure of electronic communications systems. Congressional Act of January 31,

1862 authorized the President to take possession of railroad and telegraph lines if
in his judgment public safety so required.13 Pursuant to this Act, on February 26,

1862, the President seized control of all telegraphic lines, thus laying the ground for
executive control of electronic communications and technology as part and parcel of
national defense efforts.14
By World War I, there was widespread use of wireless radios for civilian commu
nications as well as military transmission of combat information. This was a great
advantage, as wireless radios were less susceptible to damage from enemy artillery
barrages than were wired telephone lines, and they were not subject to enemy listen
ing by induction.15 British intelligence was able to crack the code used for messages
to and from the German station, and in this way intercepted the infamous German
"Zimmerman telegrams" to Mexico, which invited Mexico to attack US territory.
Technological advances in espionage had thus uncovered one of the crucial pieces of
information that would contribute to bringing America into the war.16
By 1916, the British were experimenting withjamming enemywireless intercept oper
ations, andjamming began along the entire British front in October 1916.17 Both sides
experimented with early efforts at electronic deception, such as false transmissions,

9 Since the telegraph operates using electrical signals transmitted across wire lines, telegraph opera
tions are electromagnetic in nature, as are radio, telephone, radar, infrared, ultraviolet and other less
used sections of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. See J B Calvert, The Electromagnetic Telegraph
(2000), and Tom Wheeler, Mr. Lincoln's T-Mails: The U11told Story Of How Abraham Lincoln Used The
Telegraph To Win The Civil War (2007)
10 Daniel W Crofts, Communication Breakdown, New York Times May 21, 2011.
11
David H. Bates, Lincoln in the Telegraph Office: Recollections ofthe United States Military Telegraph
Corps during the Civil War (1995) ix.
13 12 Stat. 334 ( 1862).
12 Bates (n 36) x .
14 A concession to private commercial demand for and access to the telegraph was made by the War
Department, which articulated that the possession of the telegraph lines was "not intended to interfere
in any respect with the ordinary affairs of the companies or with private business." Joshua R. Clark,
Emergency Legislation Passed Prior to December, 1917, Collected, Annotated and Indexed Under TI1e
Direction of The Attorney General, Current Emergency Legislation 10.
16
15 Sterling (n 43) 445
Sterling (n 43) 445.
1 7 Comint and Com sec: The Tactics of 1914-1918- Part I I Sum mer 1972 Vol 2, No. 3 11. The report also
notes that "[t]he British soon found that jamming was costly and ineffective and it was discontinued."
Comint and Comsec (n 47) 11.

xii

Cyberand the Changing Face of War

dummy traffic and other similar ruses for misleading the enemy.18 During World War
II, the British began to equip their aircraft with noise jammers and passive electronic
countermeasures (ECM) as an effort to foil the sophisticated Wurzburg gun-laying
German radars.19 The Japanese were meanwhile working on their own types of radars,
though their efforts were hampered by a dearth of scientists and engineers, as well as
by a shortage of materials.20 Throughout the war, there was a fight between rudimen
tary EW capabilities and simple ECM/1 such that each side would temporarily gain
the upper hand in EW, only to lose it in a new countermeasure.22
It was not until well after the advent of the internet and the attacks of9/ll, however,
that the development of cyberwar techniques began in earnest. Although the ini
tial foray in this direction came from the Bush Administration, the biggest support
for technological advance has come from the Obama Administration. In 2012, the
Administration articulated the National S ecurity Presidential Directive/NSPD-54,
which remains the US policy definition for cyberspace.23 There is now an agency
the Pentagon's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)-that has the
mission of protecting computer systems and developing the capability to disrupt or
destroy enemy systems. We are thus transformed, not only in offensive uses of cyber,
but also in our attempts to use cyber as a tool for defending against the heavily com
puter-dependent kinetic attacks of others.
Of course the United S tates and its allies are not the only world powers that have
been developing a cyberwar capacity. In 2007, security firm McAfee estimated that 120
countries had already developed ways to use the internet to target financial markets,
government computer systems, and utilities. In 2008, the Russian government alleg
edly integrated cyber operations into its conflict with Georgia. According to these
accusations, Russian cyber intelligence units conducted reconnaissance and infil
trated Georgian military and government networks. When the conventional fighting
broke out, Russia used cyberweapons to attack Georgian government and military
sites as well as communication installations. Foreign militaries, such as China's, have
conducted exercises in offensive cyber operations, both stealing information from
other governments and simulating attacks on other countries command and control
systems. In 2011, Iran boasted that it had the world's second-largest cyber army. With
states around the globe improving their cyberwarfare capabilities, the world may
experience a cyber arms race reminiscent of the nuclear arms race of the Cold War.
Arms races revolving around technological advances in war are nothing new,
and from experience we know such moments often produce significant changes
in the fundamental structure of war. Technological developments have consist
ently transformed the way wars are conducted as well as the nature of the risks
to both combatant and civilian populations. Most n otably, increasingly sophisti
cated and deadlier weapons have enabled combatants to keep a greater distance

18

See, for example, Andrew Eddowes, The Haversack Ruse, and British Deception Operations in
Palestine During World War I (1994)
19 Peter). Hugill, Global Communications Since 1844: Geopolitics and Technology (1999) 194
21
20
22 Government of India DRDO (n 33) 14
Hugill (n 50) 194.
Hugill (n SO) 162.
23
N ational Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-54 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/
HSPD-23, Subject: Cybersecurity Policy ( U), january 8, 2008 at 3.

IIl. Transformations in the Nature of War

xiii

from one another, thus diffusing the risks they face. At the same time, such tech
nologies have often broadened the scope of war, further increasing risks to civil
ian populations. Hayden's comparison between cyber and the transformative
power of the new technology reflected in the nuclear attack on Hiroshima seems
apt. Less dramatic examples, such as the development of drones, demonstrate the
same process.
Precision technologies have increased the distance between combatants at the
cost of subjecting civilian populations to new risks in other ways, ironically risks
that combatants no longer face. Despite their capacity for precision, mistakes in
the use of such weapons have been common, due to inaccurate information, unin
tended effects on third parties, ranging from death and bodily injury to more dif
fuse effects, such as the repeated stress from exposure to drones in the vicinity of
their targets. Where the use of drones is a persistent feature of everyday life, civil
ians report symptoms of trauma and anxiety from living in their midst. No tech
nological change to date, however, appears to rival this transformative potential
to the same degree as the development of cyber offensive capacities. Indeed, this
is captured by the coining of a new label for the notion of war involving cyber
attacks, namely "cyberwar," as though it were not only a new kind of weapon, but
an entirely new genre of war. The possibility that we might be able to destroy a tar
get like the Iranian nuclear reactor from the "inside out," avoiding detection for
significant periods of time while an electronic virus works its way through the sys
tem's infrastructure, opens up the possibility of just such a dramatic change in our
offensive capabilities. In addition, cyber technology creates the opportunity for a
new kind of defense strategy, one designed both to counter cyber offensives and to
pre-empt kinetic attacks, under scenarios that do not fit neatly within the tradi
tional paradigm of war. When technological evolution is combined with geopoliti
cal change, such as the demise of state sovereignty and the entrance of civilians or
non-governmental actors into the arena of war, the transformative nature of cyber
technology is enhanced.

III. Transformations in the Nature of War
The revisionary effect of technological change has conspired with dramatic changes
in the basic structure of war, particularly since the United States engaged al-Qaeda in
the wake of 9/11. The most significant shift in the demographics of war is the influx
of civilians into battle. The US is increasingly drawn into conflict with ideologically
driven populations, organized into powerful civilian militias, in lieu of governmental
forces carrying out a concerted state policy of old. With this crucial shift in the land
scape of war, the formerly bright-line distinction between state and non-state actors has
been eclipsed, and with it the boundary distinction between combatants and civilians.
However, we cannot satisfy the requirements of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC),
in particular the crucial principle of distinction, without being able reliably to identify
who is a legitimate target. In this way, changes in modern warfare have been attended
by a breakdown of the traditional foundation on which adherence to the rule of law in
war depends. There is a ripple effect: the widespread entry of civilians into the theater of

Cyber and the Changing Face of War

xiv

war results in a corresponding disintegration of the boundary between military juris
diction, on the one hand, and the jurisdiction of law enforcement, on the other.
Historically, the distinction between the civilian and combatant populations was a
sharp one. The uniform was the most visible means of marking that distinction, but
even without uniforms there would have been little doubt about who was military and
who civilian. In addition, the civilian population was kept physically separate from war
by the fact that the fighting took place on a battlefield, the boundaries of which were
fairly clear. In modern conflicts, the historical distinction of roles is no longer applica
ble, as the enemy consists in non-state actors who blend nearly seamlessly into the civil
ian population. This is facilitated by the fact that there is no longer a distinct battlefield
in war. Military operations now take place anywhere and everywhere. We might indeed
say that modern war is characterized by a loss of location and the abolition of the tradi
tional locus of battle, and with the advent of cyberwar we have that process brought to
an exteme: cyber represents the complete loss of the physical battlefield. The advent of
war in cyberspace is the culmination of that ebbing of historical boundaries around the
concept of war.
It is crucial to understand the link between the availability of cyberwar technol
ogy and the role of civilians in war. Where the threat to national security comes
primarily from non-state actors, it is reasonable to anticipate expanded use of tech
nologies of war where the barriers to entry are low. Such is the case with cyber
war: members of al-Qaeda or ISIS may, in the long run, be particularly likely to
turn to cyberweapons to compensate for the kinetic forces they lack. Despite the
elaborate effort, planning, and expertise that went into Operation Olympic Games,
destructive cyber attacks can be launched with little preparation or expense. S uch
attacks, potentially carried out by a small number of individuals with sharply lim
ited resources, have the power to impose destruction on a level that only kinetic
attacks have hitherto made possible. What enables such destructive capabilities for
apparently slight intervention and remote causal impact is the highly technological
infrastructure of modern life. We are, in effect, leveraged on technology. The same
can be said for civilian life: we are dependent on computers, and breaches of our
technological infrastructure can produce devastating results.
A second crucial change in the circumstances of war is the increasing impor
tance of both military and personal data. I n an age when individuals voluntarily
transmit, store, and receive vast amounts of personal data through the internet,
planting software in electronic devices to obliterate, alter, or appropriate data has
become a crucial new tactic of warfare: a "fifth dimension battlefield," as it is often
said, after air, sea, land and outer space. This shift in frameworks has resulted in
the merging of military and corporate espionage functions, and for this reason,
the militarization of cyberspace has created a legal and moral ambiguity regarding
privacy rights, as well as a personal liability to be targeted in cyberspace by vir
tue of the mere position one occupies relative to a network of information. These
tendencies have contributed to the shift in the structure of warfare, with the result
that the line distinction between the military and the civil domains has faded.
Cyberwar operations thus occupy a crucial position in the altered landscape of
military conflict.

IV Is Cyberwar an A c t of War?
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IV. Is Cyberwar an Act of War?
It is often debated whether cyber attacks constitute true acts of war. Those who offer a
negative answer to that question maintain that since cyber attacks can cause only limited
damage, mostly of an economic nature, such acts do not belong to the domain of war.
Those who answer affirmatively maintain the irrelevance of the fact that cyber attacks
do not cause physical damage on the grounds that this argument fails to consider the
secondary effects of infrastructure failure, particularly where the quality of civilian life
is concerned. They point out that one need only recall the loss of life routinely caused by
systems failures from electrical surges during fairly routine temperature spikes in the
summer months to recognize the destructive potential of cyber attacks.24 In addition,
they argue that the massive damage that cyber attacks can cause, and the serious use of
such attacks as an alternative to kinetic attacks in war, belies such claims. Cyberweapons
and cyberwarfare are now considered by the FBI to be the number one threat to national
security.25 On the side of the latter position, the US government has taken a functional
view of the notion of war and declared cyber attacks as acts of war/6 given that cyber
attacks increasingly serve the function that kinetic attacks have historically served. It
therefore becomes harder and harder to see such acts as limited to economic and finan
cial destruction. In response, however, those who reject cyber attacks as acts of war may
argue that the point is not that cyber attacks fail to cause destruction, but that the nature
of the destruction is unclear. Brown outs are a case in point: while damage from such
events may be significant, no one would label them acts of war as a result. Once again,
cyber events appear to challenge the traditional categories in war, leaving our theoretical
accounts of war in search of an object.
A further difficulty with the functional characterization of cyber attacks as acts of
war is that it does not specify the theory of war against which this judgment is being
made, and arguably such a theory is necessary in order to know whether a certain
characterization of acts of destruction should qualify them as acts of war. Traditional
models of warfare are problematic in this regard, since they have all been implicitly
called into question by the dramatic changes in the nature of warfare itself. In addi
tion to the advent of cyber attacks and the introduction of other new technologies,
there is a fundamental shift in features that formerly characterized acts of war in the
first place, and it may seem that the theory of war must evolve as quickly as the emer
gence of challenging marginal cases whose identity we are seeking to understand by
that theory. Because so-called "cyberwar" puts a particular strain on our traditional
conception of war, it forces us to return to the basic building blocks of just war theory
and to re-examine the theory of war in light of striking new examples.

24 See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention website at <http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml!mm6231al.htm>.
25 See, for example, "FBI: Cyber Attacks-America's Top Terror Threat," RT.com, March 2, 2012,
at <http://www.rt.com/news/cyber-fbi-security-mueller-691/>; J Nicholas Hoover, "Cyber Attacks
Becoming Top Terror Threat, FBI Says," Informationweek.com, February l, 2012, at <http://www.infor
mationweek.com/news/government/security/232600046.
26 David Sanger and Elisabeth Bulmiller, "Pentagon to Consider Cyberattacks Acts of War," The
New York Times, May 31,2012, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/0l/us/politics/Olcyber.htmb.
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Cyber attacks, for example, put immense pressure on conventional notions of sov
ereignty and the moral and legal doctrines that were developed to regulate them. The
problem stems from the fact that the traditional notion of sovereignty and the bounda
ries of states seem to disintegrate in the face of a type of conflict where boundaries are
irrelevant. Could an electronic virus designed to destroy technological infrastructure
without ever requiring the kinetic infiltration of the territory or another nation pos
sibly violate the sovereign authority of that other nation? Article 2, Section 4 of the
UN Charter promises that members will not use the "threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state." This provision, however, is
likely inadequate in view of the increasing use of cyber attacks. It leads to questions
of whether problems of cyberwarfare require new treaties and legal definitions. For
example, does the cyberweapons race require treaties similar to the Treaty on theNon
Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons? As the country that controls the internet infrastruc
ture, as well as the country with the highest percentage of internet business as a share
of its economy, the US is in a uniquely difficult negotiating position in developing any
treaties. In a world of attack and destruction without conventional military assets, do
traditional notions of sovereignty based on geography and territorial integrity retain
their relevance? Unlike past forms of warfare circumscribed by centuries of just war
tradition and Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) prescriptions, cyberwarfare occupies a
particularly ambiguous status in the traditions and conventions of the laws of war.
Then there are the difficulties associated with maintaining the principle of distinc
tion. If the threat we are facing stems from the engagement of non-state actors in hostili
ties, there is little choice but to fight the enemy on civilian territory and in and around
the civilian population.27 This has been one of the most serious developments in warfare
since World War II. In cyberwar, however, the difficulty we have demarcating the military
and civilian populations in modern warfare is exacerbated. Combatants and civilians are
arguably more intertwined than in any other form of war, and, as discussed above, the
physical identification of the battlefield, which has helped to mark a conflict as military in
nature, has been eliminated. A possible ramification is that efforts to prevent and defend
against cyber attacks will result in the complete effacement of the domains of civil and
military authority-and, to an even greater degree than exists in modern kinetic warfare,
national defense will invade the domain traditionally reserved for law enforcement. If this
is true, might military action designed to protect against cyber attacks, for example, pose
a serious threat to due process rights, or the moral equivalent of such rights in the inter
national arena? These legal ambiguities, devoid of moral perspective, make adherence to
the rule of law in cyberwarfare more challenging than in any other domain of warfare.Z8

V. A Look Ahead
The chapters in this volume grew out of a conference held at the University of
Pennsylvania by the Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law (CERL). CERL was founded
27 Stewart A Baker and Charles ) Dunla p }r, "What is the Role of Lawyers in Cyberwarfare?,"
ABA journal.corn, May l, 2012, at <http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/what_is_the_
role_of_lawyers_in_cyberwarfare>.
28
Baker and Dunlap Jr, "What is the Role of Lawyers in Cyberwarfare?" (n 8).
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in 2012 to address foundational legal and moral issues that arise in national security
and modern warfare, particularly those that impact the rule of law. The conference
was organized to explore questions about the degree to which engaging in war using
the techniques of cyber technology is compatible with rule of law values. The central
question was whether cyberwar is consistent with the idea that there are deep moral
and legal principles, adherence to which successfully limits the permissibility of war
to cases where those principles are observed. Can we both accept the legitimacy of
cyberwar and maintain that war is fundamentally a constrained activity, one that can
be justified according to a set of moral principles? Or does an acceptance of cyberwar,
insofar as it requires us to relinquish our attachment to so many of the doctrines of
just war theory, mean that we have given up on the idea that warfare can be limited, in
favor of a more Clausewitzian vision that anything goes?
If one does allow that the use of techniques of cyberwar are compatible with the tra
ditional laws of war, and hence with rule of law values, there are further and more fine
grained decisions to be made. One might ask whether the laws of war, such as those
typically applied to kinetic war, must be understood as structured in parallel fashion
when applied to cyberwar in lieu of conventional techniques of war. Do the laws of
armed conflict apply to cyberspace in the same way they apply to traditional warfare?
Proportionality, for example, is a crucial question in military ethics, as well as in domes
tic criminal law. It requires that no more force be used than is necessary to repel an attack
or meet other legitimate military objectives. But how does one determine what constitutes
a necessary response to a cyber attack? Worse, how should we determine whether it is
ever proportionate to launch an offensive cyberwar attack? Was the attack on the Iranian

nuclear reactor at Natanz a permissible act of prevention or an illegitimate first strike
between sovereign nations? More complicated still, would a cyber attack on the part of the
US against North Korea be proportionate to North Korea's threat against Sony pictures?
The current volume brings together leading authorities in law, technology, and
moral philosophy, as well as from multiple academic disciplines and representing
many types of expertise in practice, to consider the law and morality of cyberwar.
We have organized the volume into four parts. Part I contains chapters that attempt
to expose foundational and conceptual issues in cyberwar. The chapters in this part
primarily seek to answer the question whether acts of cyberwar should count as
war according to the criteria of Just War Theory. Larry May's and James Cook's
chapters directly contradict one another on this topic: May argues that so-called
cyberwar is not in fact a part of the law at all, while Cook maintains that it can be
so seamlessly considered a part of the law of war that no adjustment of the Just War
Theory paradigm is even required to fit cyberwar in. May's argument draws atten
tion to the aim and outcome of cyber attacks. He argues that insofar as such attacks
do not cause, and do not aim to cause, massive loss of life and injury, they are too
distant from the types of acts the laws of war have sought to regulate, and so can
not be considered acts of war. May's argument depends on a distinct characteriza
tion of war, one we have a!ready identified as necessary if one is to consider whether
the laws of war have proper application to cyber attacks. For example, for May, law
must be a public phenomenon. But since cyber attacks are clandestine, May argues,
they do not fit within the characterization of the norms of war that come down
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to us through the ages. Thus, May suggests that cyber attacks should be assessed
according to the ordinary rules that govern the ethics of conduct in ordinary life,
rather than according to the more permissive standard of the rules of war.
James Cook disagrees, and sees traditional Just War Theory as applying as read
ily to cyber technology as to any other type of attack or initiative in a conflict with
another sovereign state. All that is required, Cook maintains, is the ability to identify
the agents involved, the intentions with which they act, and the effects of their actions.
Hence no revision or updating of Just War Theory is necessary in order to accom
modate the central dilemmas of the cyber realm. Rather than argue for this thesis on
the grounds that Just War Theory is capacious enough to accommodate the evolving
nature of warfare, with cyberwar taking its place at the outer limits of those items to
which Just War Theory can rightly apply, Cook reaches his conclusion by asserting
the more ordinary nature of cyber attacks and cyberwar activities. Just War Theory
applies to cyberwar, then, because there is nothing particularly special to accommo
date that conventional war did not already require.
Cook's thesis makes for an interesting contrast with May's, particularly in the
characterization of cyberwar itself. While May says that cyberwar is a form of
embargo or economic constraint, thus characterizing it as an ordinary form of eco
nomic pressure, Cook takes precisely the opposite view. Not only do cyber attacks
automatically count as acts of war, given their proximity to kinetic attacks in struc
ture, they are more like war than the standard acts of war that form the para
digm of our treatment of war. Cyber attacks are more potent than other attacks,
primarily because once unleashed they require no human intervention to release
their potential. Although Cook does not put it this way, a virus like S tuxnet can be
fruitfully thought of as a kind of autonomous weapons system, since it functions
according to its programming and effectively "takes the human out of the loop."
Jens Ohlin's chapter examining the concept of causation as it applies to cyberwar
identifies particular difficulties for the law of war in the context of cyberwar. Although
causation is not in general an important concept for understanding the legal lim
its imposed by IHL, it becomes essential to understand the role of causation where
one attempts to understand the limits IHL imposes in the cyber arena. Because cyber
attacks are particularly causally complex, it is essential for identifying what Ohlin, fol
lowing George Fletcher, calls a "pattern of manifest criminality," namely that the rules
governing attribution are clear and are able to trace judgments of.responsibility along
causal lines. The greatest source of complexity lies in the causal role played by third
parties, whose involvement may help produce acts and effects that violate the law of
war. Until IHL has a more adequate account of causation, particularly as applied to
intervening voluntary acts of other agents, it will not be able to clarify the permissibil
ity of cyber interventions under the law of war.
The chapters in the second part of this volume focus on the civil-military divide
and the difficulty disentangling these frameworks in the context of cyber security and
cyberwar. Stuart Macdonald's paper, which deals with cyberwar and the criminal law,
addresses a fundamental aspect of the concept of responsibility as it relates to cyber
terrorism. Macdonald's distinction between domestic and enemy criminal law reca
pitulates the dual framework theories of earlier chapters in its distinction between
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ordinary rules of criminal prosecution and rules governing the treatment of suspected
terrorists. Macdonald points out that by treating cyber attacks under the heading of
"enemy criminal law," the British have enabled intervention earlier to prevent, rather
than merely punish, dangerous acts of cyber terrorism.
Laurie Blank's chapter addresses the split between law-enforcement principles and
the theory of war. Blank identifies the position of the notion of cyberwar relative to
these two different jurisdictions as hovering in the middle. She allows that cyber
war could constitute an "armed conflict" within the prevailing use of the term and
against the background of the LOAC. However, such instances are unlikely, as under
the principles and authority of international law, the relevant conflict must be fairly
intense before cyber conflict would be rightly seen as part of an armed conflict. As
Blank implicitly recognizes, cyberwar is an in-between concept that hovers between
law-enforcement and military paradigms. As such it provides a theoretically useful
way to test out the boundaries of our conception of war.
Nicolo Bussolati's chapter echoes the thought that the possibility of significant
destruction of infrastructure through cyberwar is particularly relevant given the
increased role of non-state actors in current armed conflict. He goes yet further, how
ever, and argues that the availability of cyber techniques in war has actually helped
establish a place for non-state actors in international relations and, which in turn cre
ates a challenge for how we think of cyberwar in relation to the traditional paradigm
of war. Bussolati sees cyber attacks as constituting a use of force, and as posing a dan
ger of the first order. Rather than view hacking as involving a lower risk of force than
kinetic attacks, he might see such attacks as having comparably graver dangers and
constituting a more, rather than less, invasive means of accomplishing military ends.
The third part of this volume deals with a somewhat more applied topic, namely
the ethics of hacking and spying. Duncan Hollis begins by weighing in strongly on
James Cook's side of the debate about the nature of cyberwar, and whether it is part
of the LOAC. The concepts of the jus ad bellum-the principles of justice accounting
for when it is permissible to go to war-and the jus in bello-the principles that iden
tify the manner of one's conducting war-apply by way of analogy with the non-cyber
law of war and find an adequate foothold in the world of cyberwar to make it reason
able to think of it as part of the law of armed conflict. International law does regu
late cyberspace at the very least by analogy. However, Hollis laments the absence of a
clear theory to explain why. The usual explanation-that IHL imposes boundaries on
the permissibility of acts of war that should be thought of as extending to the cyber
arena-strikes Hollis as a highly imperfect argument. A more flexible way of think
ing of IHL, oriented towards principles rather than boundaries, might impose a duty
to adopt the "least harmful means available" for achieving military objectives. And
given that cyberwar can be less invasive and harmful than kinetic actions, IHL might
impose an affirmative duty to attempt to achieve a military objective by hacking rather
than kinetic action.
Christopher Yoo weighs into the debate about the choice of frameworks for assess
ing cyber activity in the context of war by discussing espionage. The argument falls on
Larry May's side of the fence, in the debate between May and Cook. The chapter's claim
is that cyber operations should mostly be thought more in the domain of espionage
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and law enforcement than acts of war. Yoo's argument for this position-that cyber
acts do not cause the same level of damage as kinetic attacks-might send us debat
ing again how we characterize the damage caused by the S tuxnet virus. However, the
point can be reasserted in another guise: the essential role of personal, internet-based
information in the fight against terrorism cannot be over-estimated. As such, espio
nage becomes a central tool in national security operations and many cyber opera
tions are properly identified under this heading.
The third chapter in this section, William Boothby's, treats cyberwar as a critically
important domain for future warfare. He writes:
The rifle, the bayonet, mortars, bombs, missiles, and mines will remain critically
important tools in the conduct of hostilities in many future, conventional armed
conflicts ... But cyberspace will . . . become the environment in which adversaries
employing some degree of operational sophistication will seek to gain and to main
tain military advantage by leveraging their own hostile activities while impeding the
enemy's capacity to organize and operate
However, Boothby raises the concern that insofar as cyber operations typically involve
the employment of deceptive tactics, they may be illegitimate and illegal under the
laws of war.
A fourth section deals with the crucial and difficult question of responsibility for
cyber attacks. Marco Roscini identifies particular challenges to assessing responsibil
ity for cyber attacks due to evidentiary hurdles. The problems he identifies stem on the
one hand from the famously difficult problem of attribution in the domain of cyber
attacks, combined with the evidentiary rules that govern international law, particu
larly the rules on the use of force.
S ean Watts's chapter represents something of a digression from our themes thus far,
though an interesting and relevant one. It addresses the conflict between the principle
of non-intervention in international law and the existence of low-level cyber signals
among states. The question he poses is whether the existence of these cyber connec
tions violates the principle of non-intervention. He offers interpretations of the latter
principle that would allow low-level cyber connections to persist.
Taken together, the chapters in this volume constitute a comprehensive examination of
the challenges that have arisen in the law of armed conflict since the advent of cyber inter
vention as a means for achieving military objectives. While authors are not in perfect
agreement with one another, they have broad consensus on the identity of the challenges
the world faces as a result of the advent of cyber technology as a means of war. The major
problems addressed in the chapters in this volume-whether cyber operations constitute
acts of war, the civil-military divide and the choice between law enforcement and mili
tary frameworks, the ethics of hacking and espionage, and finally the attribution of legal
and moral responsibility for cyber activities-cover the essential challenges in under
standing the fifth dimension battlefield and in identifying the nascent legal and ethical
boundaries within which national defense in cyber must operate. With cyber becoming
an increasingly important technique for national self defense, clarity around the bound
aries of war in the Fifth Dimension seems essential. We hope this volume contributes
towards this end.

